2026 Healthcare Imaging Cybersecurity Roadmap: Protecting PACS from Ransomware

Protecting PACS and enterprise imaging systems from ransomware requires layered controls across identities, networks, endpoints, interfaces, archives, backups, and recovery procedures. Health systems should segment imaging traffic, restrict privileged access, encrypt data in transit where supported, maintain protected recovery copies, monitor unusual transfer activity, and test restoration of clinically critical workflows.
Prevention is only part of the program. A ransomware plan must also define how the organization will isolate affected systems, maintain access to current and prior images, restore trusted services in the correct order, validate recovered data, and reconcile studies created while primary systems were unavailable.
The HHS Healthcare and Public Health Cybersecurity Performance Goals provide a useful baseline for the healthcare sector. The NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 provides a broader structure for governing, identifying, protecting, detecting, responding to, and recovering from cybersecurity risk.
Why Ransomware Creates Specific Risks for Imaging Systems
Enterprise imaging environments connect modalities, PACS, VNA, DICOM routers, worklists, viewers, reporting applications, EHR interfaces, AI services, cloud platforms, and remote sites. Each connection introduces an identity, network, software, or vendor dependency.
Several characteristics make imaging recovery from a ransomware attack difficult:
- Imaging studies are large and expensive to restore from remote storage.
- Clinicians need both current exams and relevant prior studies.
- Legacy modalities may not support current encryption, authentication, or endpoint security tools.
- PACS availability depends on databases, storage, interfaces, routing, identity services, DNS, certificates, and time synchronization.
- Remote sites and vendors may require external connectivity.
- A replicated archive may copy malicious changes or deletions to a secondary environment.
- An available archive does not guarantee that clinicians can view, interpret, and report studies.
A comprehensive ransomware plan therefore protects both the data and the complete clinical workflow.
Common Ransomware Attack Paths in Enterprise Imaging
| Attack path | Imaging risk | Priority control |
|---|---|---|
| Internet-facing remote-access service | Attackers use stolen credentials or an unpatched service to enter the network | Remove unnecessary exposure, require phishing-resistant MFA where supported, and monitor access |
| Shared or reused administrative accounts | One compromised account provides access to multiple systems | Use unique accounts, separate standard and privileged access, and manage service credentials |
| Flat clinical network | An infected workstation can reach modalities, PACS, archives, and interfaces | Segment systems by function and restrict traffic to approved sources, destinations, ports, and services |
| Legacy modality or appliance | The system cannot run current endpoint tools or secure transport | Isolate it, restrict communications, monitor behavior, and use a secured gateway or proxy where appropriate |
| Vendor support connection | Persistent or poorly monitored access becomes an entry point | Use an approved gateway, MFA, time-limited access, session logging, and prompt credential revocation |
| DICOMweb, FHIR, or vendor API | Weak authentication or excessive authorization exposes data and functions | Require HTTPS, strong authentication, scoped authorization, certificate management, and API logging |
| Compromised DICOM application entity | The system sends, retrieves, or modifies data outside its normal workflow | Allowlist connections and monitor unusual query, retrieval, storage, and routing behavior |
| Reachable backup administration | Attackers delete, encrypt, or turn off recovery copies | Separate backup identities and administration, protect retention settings, and maintain offline or immutable copies |
| Compromised management workstation | Attackers gain access to multiple imaging platforms | Use privileged access workstations, restrict administrative paths, and monitor configuration changes |
| Unpatched PACS, viewer, router, or interface | Attackers exploit a known vulnerability | Maintain an inventory, track vendor advisories, and prioritize vulnerabilities listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog |
Prioritized PACS and Imaging Cybersecurity Checklist
The following controls provide a practical starting point for a PACS and Imaging Cybersecurity Checklist. Health systems should adapt them to local architecture and risk.
| Priority | Control | Evidence to maintain |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Inventory modalities, PACS, VNA, routers, viewers, interfaces, servers, software versions, certificates, service accounts, and vendor connections | Current asset inventory with system owners and dependencies |
| 2 | Remove unnecessary internet exposure | External scan results and approved exceptions |
| 3 | Require MFA for remote, administrative, cloud, and vendor access where technically capable | Identity-policy reports and authentication logs |
| 4 | Use unique credentials and separate standard from privileged accounts | Account inventory, access reviews, and termination records |
| 5 | Track vulnerabilities and vendor-supported remediation | Patch records, risk acceptances, and compensating controls |
| 6 | Segment imaging systems and restrict communications | Network diagrams, firewall rules, and approved traffic flows |
| 7 | Encrypt imaging data in transit where supported | DICOM conformance statements, TLS configurations, and certificate inventory |
| 8 | Centralize security and operational logs | Log-source inventory, alerts, retention policy, and review evidence |
| 9 | Protect backup and recovery infrastructure from production credentials | Separate accounts, object-lock settings, immutable-copy evidence, and recovery test results |
| 10 | Document incident-response and imaging-continuity procedures | Approved runbooks, contact lists, downtime procedures, and exercise results |
| 11 | Define workflow-specific RTO and RPO targets | Business-impact analysis and recovery worksheet |
| 12 | Test restoration, not just backup creation | Timed recovery results, clinical validation, exceptions, and corrective actions |
These controls align with the HHS healthcare cybersecurity goals, which include vulnerability mitigation, MFA, strong encryption, unique credentials, separate privileged accounts, vendor controls, incident planning, asset inventory, network segmentation, and centralized logging.
Should DICOM Traffic Be Encrypted?
DICOM is not consistently described as either secure or insecure across all implementations. A traditional DICOM association may transmit data without encryption, but DICOM PS3.15 defines security and system-management profiles that implementations can support.
DICOM PS3.15 includes:
- Secure transport connection profiles
- TLS-based transport
- Entity authentication mechanisms
- Audit-message formats and transmission
- Digital-signature profiles
- Attribute-confidentiality and de-identification profiles
- DICOM-specific security events
When both endpoints support a compatible secure transport, organizations should use DICOM over TLS and verify the product’s conformance statement, certificate requirements, supported TLS profiles, ports, and key management process.
For DICOMweb, use HTTPS with supported authentication and authorization controls. A claim of DICOMweb support does not establish which security mechanisms the product implements.
Compensating controls for legacy systems
Some modalities and older PACS components cannot support current TLS or identity mechanisms. In those cases, apply controls such as:
- A dedicated modality or legacy-device network segment
- Firewall rules that permit communication only with approved systems
- A secured DICOM gateway, router, or proxy
- Private connections or managed tunnels between sites
- Monitoring for unexpected destinations, ports, or traffic volumes
- Restricted administrative access
- A documented replacement or remediation plan
Do not publish a fixed cipher list in a long-lived article. Cryptographic configuration should follow current security policy, DICOM conformance documentation, vendor support, and applicable standards.
How Imaging Networks Should Be Segmented
Network segmentation limits the systems an attacker can reach and reduces lateral movement. It should not prevent necessary clinical communication.
A practical imaging architecture separates systems according to function, risk, and management requirements.
Imaging segmentation reference model

Each connection should have a documented clinical purpose. Firewall and access policies should restrict communication to the required sources, destinations, services, and ports.
Segmentation should also separate:
- User workstations from imaging servers
- Modalities from administrative networks
- Production systems from test systems
- Primary environments from recovery infrastructure
- Vendor support paths from general remote access
- Backup administration from production administration
- Cloud-management accounts from routine enterprise accounts
What Zero Trust Means for Imaging
Zero trust does not mean that every imaging transaction requires a person for MFA. It means the organization does not grant implicit trust solely because a user, modality, application, or server is inside the network.
For enterprise imaging, zero-trust principles include:
- Authenticate users, services, devices, and applications where technically capable.
- Authorize access according to the specific resource and workflow.
- Apply least privilege to service accounts and administrators.
- Restrict a modality to the PACS, worklist, router, or archive services it needs.
- Re-evaluate trust when device status, identity risk, location, or behavior changes.
- Record access and administrative actions.
- Do not treat a VPN connection as unrestricted access to the imaging environment.
Legacy systems may not directly support modern zero-trust controls. Segmentation, gateways, allowlists, monitoring, and limited service accounts can provide compensating protection.
Detecting Suspicious Imaging Activity
Traditional security tools may not understand whether a DICOM transaction is normal for a specific imaging workflow. Security monitoring should therefore combine infrastructure telemetry with imaging operational context.
Monitor for events such as:
- Sudden increases in DICOM storage or retrieval volume
- Unusual C-FIND, C-MOVE, C-GET, or export activity
- Transfers to a new application entity, address, or destination
- Large retrievals outside normal operating periods
- Repeated failed associations or authentication attempts
- Unexpected route, rule, or configuration changes
- Certificate failures or expired certificates
- New administrative or service accounts
- Queue growth, stalled processing, or widespread delivery failures
- Archive deletion or retention-policy changes
- Backup failures or disabled object-lock settings
- Loss of communication with multiple modalities or sites
DICOM PS3.15 audit profiles define formats for recording events such as data access, DICOM transfers, queries, deletions, security alerts, and authentication.
Imaging operational monitoring should feed or complement the organization’s SIEM, endpoint monitoring, network detection, and incident-response processes.
Protecting Imaging Backups from Ransomware
Backup, replication, high availability, and disaster recovery are not interchangeable.
- Backup preserves one or more recoverable copies.
- Replication copies data to another system or location.
- High availability keeps a service operating during certain component failures.
- Disaster recovery restores systems and workflows after a major outage or compromise.
- Clinical continuity provides access to the functions clinicians need while primary systems remain unavailable.
Replication alone does not provide ransomware protection. It may copy encrypted data, malicious changes, or deletions to the secondary environment.
The CISA StopRansomware Guide recommends offline or protected backups, recovery testing, golden system images, versioning, separate recovery resources, and prioritization of critical dependencies.
An imaging backup strategy should include:
- Offline, immutable, or object-locked recovery copies
- Separate backup and production credentials
- MFA for backup administration where supported
- Protected encryption keys and certificates
- Retention that provides multiple recovery points
- Versioning and deletion protection
- Copies separated by account, platform, location, or administrative boundary
- Protected system configurations, software, licenses, and installation media
- PACS database and index protection in addition to image-object storage
- Documented procedures for rebuilding interfaces, routes, worklists, and viewers
- Regular recovery of representative recent and historical studies
- Validation that restored studies remain complete, readable, indexed, and associated with the correct patients
A backup is not proven until the organization restores and validates it.
Imaging-System Recovery Sequence
A health system should define the sequence before an incident. The exact order will depend on local dependencies, but the plan should address the following stages.
- Contain the incident
Isolate affected systems and network segments. Preserve evidence in accordance with the incident-response plan. Avoid reconnecting systems simply because they appear operational. - Establish a trusted recovery environment.
Confirm clean administrative workstations, accounts, identity services, network paths, DNS, time synchronization, certificate services, and communications channels. - Confirm the recovery point.
Determine which backup or replica predates the compromise. Validate its integrity before restoration. - Restore essential imaging transport.
Restore or rebuild the routing, interface, worklist, and site-connectivity services required to receive new studies and preserve clinical operations. - Restore access to current studies.
Prioritize emergency, inpatient, surgical, and other clinically urgent imaging in accordance with the approved recovery plan. - Restore PACS and archive services.
Recover databases, indices, image objects, configurations, and storage connections. A restored image store without its database and patient context may not provide usable clinical access. - Restore viewers, reporting, and EHR connections
Verify diagnostic viewing, backup viewing, report creation, result distribution, and links from the EHR. - Validate the workflow
Test acquisition, storage, query and retrieval, relevant-prior access, viewing, reporting, and EHR result delivery. Confirm patient and study identifiers. - Reconcile downtime activity
Import or reconcile studies, reports, orders, and demographic changes created while primary systems were unavailable. - Resume production under heightened monitoring
Reconnect systems in controlled stages and monitor for recurring indicators of compromise, failed transactions, duplicate studies, or missing results.
Read more about the difference between backups and a complete enterprise imaging disaster-recovery plan.
RTO and RPO for Imaging Workflows
Recovery targets should reflect clinical workflows rather than applying a single target across the entire imaging environment.
- Recovery Time Objective, or RTO, is the targeted time for restoring a system or workflow after disruption.
- Recovery Point Objective, or RPO, is the maximum acceptable amount of data loss measured in time.
NIST contingency-planning guidance distinguishes recovery time from the point in time to which data must be recovered.
Imaging RTO and RPO worksheet
| Workflow or service | RTO question | RPO question | Critical dependencies |
|---|---|---|---|
| New-study routing | How long can modalities operate without confirmed delivery? | How many unsent or unconfirmed studies can the site safely retain? | Modalities, router, network, PACS |
| Emergency image access | How long can emergency clinicians work without current images? | How much recent imaging can be unavailable? | PACS, viewer, identity, storage |
| Relevant-prior access | How long can interpretation continue without historical studies? | Which prior-study period must be immediately recoverable? | VNA, PACS, viewer, network |
| Modality worklist | How long can staff use manual entry safely? | How many orders or demographic updates can require reconciliation? | EHR, RIS, HL7, worklist provider |
| Diagnostic reporting | How long can reporting operate in downtime mode? | How many reports can require later reconciliation? | Viewer, reporting system, EHR |
| Archive restoration | How quickly must the full historical archive return? | What is the latest acceptable protected recovery point? | Object storage, database, index, keys |
| EHR imaging links | How long can users rely on an alternate viewer or workflow? | Which studies and reports must be re-associated? | EHR, identity, viewer, interfaces |
The organization should document who approved each target, how the architecture supports it, and whether testing has demonstrated it.
Testing Imaging Ransomware Recovery
A tabletop exercise tests decisions and communications. A technical recovery test proves whether systems and data can be restored. A clinical validation confirms that caregivers can use the recovered workflow.
Testing should include:
- Incident declaration and escalation
- Out-of-band communications
- Isolation of affected systems
- Vendor and cyber-insurer contact procedures
- Recovery-account access
- Certificate, key, software, and license availability
- Restoration into a clean environment
- Routing of a new study
- Query and retrieval of a recent and historical study
- Access through primary and backup viewers
- Modality-worklist operation or downtime alternatives
- Report creation and EHR delivery
- Validation of patient and study identifiers
- Reconciliation of downtime activity
- Failback to the primary environment
- Measurement against approved RTO and RPO targets
Test after major architectural, software, identity, network, storage, or vendor changes. Record failures and assign corrective actions.
Regulatory and Vendor Considerations
The current HIPAA Security Rule requires regulated organizations to apply administrative, physical, and technical safeguards to electronic protected health information. As of August 2026, OCR continues to describe its strengthened cybersecurity modifications as a proposed rule, not a replacement for the rule currently in effect.
The FDA’s February 2026 medical-device cybersecurity guidance addresses cybersecurity design, documentation, and resilience for manufacturers of devices that pose cybersecurity risks. Health systems can use relevant portions of that guidance when evaluating connected imaging devices and vendors. Still, it should not be presented as a direct operational requirement for every hospital system.
Vendor evaluation should cover:
- Supported TLS and authentication methods
- DICOM and DICOMweb conformance
- Software-component and vulnerability disclosure
- Patch availability and support timelines
- Secure deployment guidance
- Audit and logging capabilities
- Remote-support controls
- Backup and restoration requirements
- High-availability and disaster-recovery support
- Security incident notification
- End-of-support and replacement planning
- Evidence of recovery testing
Frequently Asked Questions
How can hospitals protect PACS from ransomware?
Hospitals should combine MFA, unique credentials, privileged access controls, network segmentation, vulnerability management, secure vendor access, encryption where supported, centralized monitoring, protected recovery copies, and tested incident response and restoration procedures.
Should DICOM traffic be encrypted?
DICOM traffic should use compatible TLS security profiles when the connected systems support them. Legacy systems that cannot support secure transport should use segmentation, restricted network paths, gateways, allowlists, and monitoring as compensating controls.
How should imaging networks be segmented?
Separate modalities, imaging integration services, PACS and VNA platforms, clinical viewers, user networks, management systems, vendor access, and recovery infrastructure. Permit only the communications required for approved clinical workflows.
What does zero trust mean for imaging?
Zero trust means that a user, device, modality, application, or server does not receive access simply because it is inside the network. The organization authenticates and authorizes access according to the resource, workflow, device, and risk.
How should imaging systems be recovered after a ransomware attack?
Contain affected systems, establish a trusted recovery environment, identify a clean recovery point, restore required dependencies, recover routing and clinical access, restore archives and applications, validate the complete workflow, reconcile downtime activity, and return to production under heightened monitoring.
How Dicom Systems Supports Secure and Resilient Imaging Workflows
The Dicom Systems Unifier platform provides vendor-neutral DICOM routing and imaging workflow services across on-premises, cloud, and hybrid environments. It supports TLS and HTTPS connectivity, LDAP, MFA and single sign-on integration, configurable routing, delivery validation, and detailed workflow logging.
Unifier can help organizations apply controlled connectivity across modalities, PACS, VNA, RIS, EHR, AI applications, cloud services, and remote sites. Health systems choose which systems to connect and which security policies govern those connections.
Related Dicom Systems capabilities include:
- Unifier High Availability, which uses an active-passive architecture and automated failover to maintain imaging workflow services during supported node failures
- Unifier Archive VNA, which supports imaging storage and retrieval across on-premises, cloud, and hybrid deployments
- Clinical Backup Viewer, which provides browser-based access to imaging studies when the primary PACS is unavailable and can pair with Lifeboat, a synchronized backup archive
- Unifier Command Center, which provides centralized visibility into workflow activity, software versions, queues, traffic spikes, node availability, and delivery problems
- Enterprise imaging disaster-recovery workflows, which support planning for alternate infrastructure, protected storage, clinical access, and restoration
High availability does not replace ransomware recovery. Operational monitoring does not replace a SIEM or endpoint security. A synchronized archive does not replace an immutable or offline recovery copy. These capabilities should operate as part of the health system’s broader identity, network, endpoint, backup, incident-response, and recovery program.
Meet with a Dicom Systems workflow expert to review the imaging systems you need to connect, as well as the secure routing, segmentation, monitoring, high-availability, backup viewing, and recovery workflows required to maintain clinical access.